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After two decades of intense debate about the determinants of economic development, with authors 
examining the variables that characterize geography, institutions and international trade, BRICS countries 
were left behind. Thus, in order to fill this gap, this paper uses econometrics of panel data to analyze the 
economic performance of these developing nations. Mainstream economists have run into serious problems 
to deal with these particular determinants within the traditional endogenous growth model, and they have 
not come up with an agreement, so they keep trying to figure out who is the “winner of this competition”. 
Empirical evidence shows that there is not a unique explanatory determinant, and recognizing which of 
them can provide the best understanding depends on the particularities of each case (ROS, 2013). 
Examining BRICS as a group of countries demonstrates that these specific developing nations share some 
remarkable features. They are rapidly-growing nations with a vast amount of land and growing participation 
in international trade. So, empirical tests are feasible and desirable in order to understand their recent 
development. However, they are also different in many aspects, mostly in terms of institutional 
characteristics. Thus, our goal is to find out if the econometrics of panel data can shed some light on this 
ongoing debate.  
The aim of this paper is twofold. It seeks the understanding of the recent history of the BRICS and to 
empirically test the importance of the omitted determinants of growth (geography, institutions and 
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international trade) in the case of these five countries.  The World Bank, the IMF and various research 
institutes have been gathering information about the five states over the last decades. Our empirical model 
tests if these determinants have had impact on their income per capita. The empirical section uses the 
Hausman-Taylor estimator to pool both cross sectional data (time invariant data such as geography 
measures) with time series data (time variant measures such as indices from the World Bank). Section 2 
presents the context that explains how BRICS arose as a group. Section 3 gathers the main branches of 
literature regarding the effects of the three deep determinants of growth and presents our independent 
variables. This sets the stage for our empirical results. Section 4 explains the model, the data, and the 
Hausman-Taylor estimation procedure that makes using recent World Bank institutional measures a 
possible panel dataset. Finally, section 5 discusses the results in the context of our discussion, and section 6 
presents the conclusion.  
 
BRICS 
Developing an approach linked to international relations’ hegemonic stability theory, the Italian 
economist Giovanni Arrighi (2010) attempted to explain the evolution of the international system through a 
succession of hegemonies between which it is possible to identify some transitional periods, which initiate 
with what the author himself calls a “signal crisis” and end with a “terminal crisis”, that demarcates a new 
period of hegemony. 
With the debacle of the Soviet Union, we could envision, given the American triumph in the Cold 
War, the rise of a new unipolar era, that is to say the enshrinement of the Pax Americana. After a power gap 
left by the British downfall at the beginning of the twentieth century, the post-1991 signalized that another 
hegemonic cycle of Arrighi’s theory was taking place. Even though, since the symbolic milestone of the 
September 11 attacks in New York, the possibility of an American long-term prevalence was tightly 
contested by many analysts, including Jim O’Neill, researcher on global economics at Goldman Sachs. That 
was the context when he, in 2001, attached, to Brazil, Russia, India and China, the label BRIC: emergent 
nations with a high economic growth potential which could complement or undermine Western dominance. 
Only in 2003, however, O’Neill made a deeper analysis of the aforementioned group. With a prediction that 
the four BRIC economies would overcome the GDP of G6 countries in 2050, the term became popular and 
reached an influence network that transcends the financial sphere. 
O’Neill’s classification has surely eased the creation process of a political group. Since 2005, with 
the invitation of Russian chancellor Sergey Lavrov for an informal meeting on the backstage of the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), a series of formal and informal gatherings among heads of State and 
ministers has taken place, and its apex can be portrayed by the “BRICS summits”, hold annually since 2009.  
Furthermore, it could be said that the process of cooperation between BRIC countries began in the 
field of international finances, taking into account the dissatisfaction with the anti-democratic processes 
adopted by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for selecting their managers 
and, in addition, with the anachronistic IMF quota system. The consensus which was reached in this domain 
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led to efforts of cooperation in other sectors, such as education, public health, agriculture, defense, 
cooperatives and judiciary system. It is within this perspective that Stuenkel (2015) identifies a spillover 
process, different, however, from Haas’s neofunctional4 concept, since it is not related to interest groups 
outside the government willing to guide the integration process. 
In 2010, with South Africa’s entry to the bloc, BRIC became BRICS and, hence, consolidated itself as 
a political group, deviating from the criterion envisioned by O’Neill, who expressed dissatisfaction with this 
admission. South Africa, without a large population or an expressive economic growth as other countries, 
such as Nigeria and Indonesia, represented an African leadership provided of a remarkable amount of soft 
power due to the building of solid democratic institutions since the end of the apartheid regime. Thus, this 
recent enlargement strengthens the bloc’s bargaining power in multilateral negotiations. 
Alongside the fifth BRICS Summit, in 2013, the release of the idea of building a group’s 
development bank by India was the necessary boost toward the bloc’s effective institutionalization. Under 
this scenario, in the sixth Summit, in 2014, the Bank’s creation was formalized. The so-called New 
Development Bank was endowed with a $100 billion initial authorized capital and a $50 billion subscribed 
capital. It was decided to allocate its headquarters in Shanghai; furthermore, the first president would be 
Indian. Moreover, the partnership decided to create a Contingency Reserve Arrangement as well, also 
provided with a $100 billion initial capital and addressed to tackle liquidity crises due to short-term 
difficulties in the balance of payments, analogously to IMF. A conspicuous difference between these two 
new institutions concerns the members’ participation quotas; whilst all the five partners contribute with the 
same amount in the case of the Bank and, hence, have the same voting power, their financial contributions 
and voting rights are unequal in the Contingency Reserve - China is the most important shareholder, and 
South Africa the least. 
In spite of the described process of institutionalization cooperation, many analysts remain skeptical 
with respect to prospects for the deepening of integration between the five countries. The main critique 
concerns the lack of cohesion among members: three democracies (Brazil, South Africa and India) contrast 
with two authoritarian regimes (China and Russia); two permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (China and Russia) with three candidates to a seat; and three nuclear weapons states (China, Russia 
and India) with two supporters of the disarmament (Brazil and South Africa). 
Nonetheless, it is necessary to notice that, regardless of prospects for political integration, the 
group remains as a unique focus of attention of the international society due to its rising participation in 
the world economy. Even in the face of a recessive scenario for three of its members (Brazil, South Africa 
and Russia), in large part due to the extension of the 2008 financial crisis through the fall in commodities 
prices, the features of these countries which have inspired confidence about their future and spread 
O’Neill’s label are still valid, remarkably for BRIC and less intensely for South Africa, which, as we 
explained, joined the group more for political reasons than for its economic potential. After all, our 
                                                          
4 Neofunctionalism, in International Relations, supports the idea that increasing integration between states in one economic sector 
leads to the deepening of integration in further sectors. 
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argument is that they are anchored in what we can call deep determinants of growth: geography, 
institutions and international trade (PERRY; SCHONERWALD, 2012).    
 
Geography, International Trade and Institutions 
Approaches that consider geography, institutions and international trade as determinants of 
economic growth consist in a promising– but already robust – trend in the current literature. Indeed, 
referring to an extensive literature review as well as to econometric tests, important studies, such as those 
of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Rodrik, Subramaniam and Trebbi (2002), Sachs (2003), Rodrik 
(2004), Perry and Schonerwald (2012) and Mitton (2016), have recently sought to articulate these factors in 
order to cope with the problem of finding out what are the deep motivations of growth. It is in the light of 
this important trend in literature that this paper has been conceived.  
The impact of geography on the development of nations has been widely discussed by the Academia. 
Jared Diamond (1997) explained the role played by geography in ruling the primacy of some peoples in 
agriculture. Hence, the ones who used to live in fertile regions, with more nutritive food and economically 
useful animals, have always had some advantages. This has allowed labor specialization and the invention 
of steel and weapons and tools made of this alloy - key elements of the wealth of developed societies.  
Specifically, regarding economic growth, Rodrik (2004) affirms that there are two ways by which 
geography exerts its influence: one is direct and another indirect. There is wider divergence among scholars 
with respect to the significance of the first mechanism, albeit many authors attach geographic determinants 
to the economic performance with no intervenient variables, such as Sachs (2003) by his malaria ecology 
index. The indirect effects of geography through institutions, however, reach greater agreement in the 
academia. The environment where an institutional evolution is inserted plays an eminent role in the 
comprehension of this process. In this way, it is possible to understand the inverse relationship between the 
abundance of natural resources and the institutional quality established by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2003). 
In this study, we employ distance from the Equator as the first geographic variable, in concert with 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002), who have identified a positive relationship between latitude and 
the institutional quality. Furthermore, it is not possible to neglect the existence of a long-lasting academic 
tradition in Economics and Social Sciences related to geographic determinism, which identifies proximity to 
the Equator as an obstacle for prosperity. Jeffrey Sachs (2000), for instance, explains why the temperate 
zones are wealthier than the tropical ones by the higher agriculture productivity, the lesser propensity to 
diseases and the better provision of energetic resources, such as gas and oil. 
Moreover, since the large population of BRIC countries, later BRICS, was one of the reasons for the 
long-term optimism which led to the spread of O’Neill’s label, we employ it as the second geographic 
variable. After all, the idea that the larger the labor force, the wealthier a nation is, representing a crucial 
element for the national prosperity, is an ancient thesis that dates back to the mercantilists, such as Colbert. 
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Lastly, in addition to the indirect effect of geography on the economic development through 
institutions, we can also envisage it by international trade. According to the gravitational theory, the 
distance between two countries is a relevant factor to determine the trade flow, which, in turn, has effects 
on per capita income, as we mention further. This indirect effect through international trade is embedded in 
the variables chosen to reflect the third deep determinant of growth, that is to say international trade. 
The second determinant are institutions. Their impact on economic development is related to 
Keynes’s concept of expectations. Since investments are directly proportional to the confidence of the 
capitalists in an economy, the state is obligated to ensure a healthy environment for private initiative and to 
develop a regulatory mechanism able to tame the “animal spirits”.  In view of this, in 1989, the financial 
entities which represented Bretton Woods System drew up the Washington Consensus. It was believed that 
the commitment of national institutions to the free market model by means of tight fiscal and monetary 
rules, aside from other bulwarks such as intellectual property rights, economic deregulation, trade openness 
and privatizations, would achieve safety regarding private property rights and thus enhance capital 
attraction.  This is mainly the approach of New Institutional Economics, of Douglass North and Ronald 
Coase. For them, this kind of institutions would diminish the transactional costs and, hence, foster 
economic growth. 
If, on the one hand, institutional efforts to guarantee property rights are important, on the other 
hand they are not sufficient in a world that gets gradually more globalized. Reforms aiming to foster the 
effectiveness of government action, such as central bank and judicial independence and mechanisms to 
combat corruption, called by Rodrik (2004) as second-generation reforms, have increasingly obtained 
eminence in investment decision-making and in classifications of rating agencies. 
Another relevant institutional component in determining economic growth is the degree of 
democracy. In a philosophical approach, there is the perception, rooted in Kant, that it would be possible to 
reach the world peace when the democratic republican model became universal; without war, we would be 
able to envisage an international environment where cooperation prevailed, what, in turn, would take place 
via the narrowing of economic ties among nations in a complex interdependence scenario (KEOHANE; NYE, 
1977) fostering individual and collective gains. 
The focus on democracy can also raise purely economic approaches, such as Acemoglu, Naidu, 
Restrepo and Robinson’s (2015) work. According to these scholars, there is no evidence to affirm that 
democracy is an obstacle for the growth of less developed countries. Furthermore, democratization 
processes, despite the possibility of a short-term contraction, are able to increase GDP per capita by around 
20% in the long term (25 years). 
Therefore, we cannot neglect institutions as a deep determinant of growth. In our econometric test, 
we employ the rule of law index from the World Bank, which measures the normative strength of 
institutions, and contract intensive money (CIM), proposed by Clague, Knack and Olson (1999) to evaluate 
the safety of property rights through individual choices to allocate financial resources, as variables. 
Moreover, we also employ the annual rates of infant mortality- which allow us to measure the institutional 
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effectiveness by the performance of the polices aimed at combating this major social problem-, the political 
stability and absence of violence and control of corruption indices, calculated by the World Bank, and the 
financial risk, a component of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), published by Harvard Data verse 
with the goal of estimating the sanity of financial institutions.  
Finally, international trade is the third deep determinant of growth. The commercial reality of each 
country is an essential factor to explain its income. According to Frankel and Romer (1999), trade has a 
positive and quantitatively robust effect on GDP, in spite of being only moderate statistically. Hence, 
evidence corroborate the liberal assumption, rooted in the comparative advantages theory and in the factor 
endowment theory, that trade openness is a propelling element for national income. 
The same authors underline the eminent role played by geography in the determination of the 
tradable amount. Indeed, for them, the effect on trade is the only way geographic variables can affect 
income, what contrasts with the arguments exposed when we talked about geography and with the results of 
our econometric test. Their approach is based upon the gravitational theory, which relates inversely the 
amount of trade between two nations to the distance that separates them.  In their work, stemming from 
this equation, a model for the global trade of a country is built, that is to say the estimation of the amount 
of trade a nation achieves with all its partnerships in the world. In this regard, it is possible to understand 
how the location of countries impact their propensity to commerce. For instance, insular nations such as 
New Zealand have fewer advantages in exchanging goods because of the high freight charges. Thus, the first 
commercial variable of our econometric model is the degree of openness of each country (the percentage of 
the international trade in relation to the GDP), which captures the results of trade policies, that can be more 
or less protectionists, and the indirect effects of geography. 
Furthermore, we must remark that economic development is directly related to terms of trade. If a 
nation, in its trade relations, faces increasingly unfavorable terms, it is possible to envisage a trend toward 
the strangulation of the balance of payments and, hence, a scenario of macroeconomic instability. The 
importance of terms of trade was remarkably discussed by the structuralists from ECLAC, who used to argue 
that, as long as income elasticity of the imports was higher in the center than in the periphery, Latin 
American agricultural goods would continually lose its share in the composition of central countries’ 
demand, generating a chronic instability which could not be solved by orthodox policies (SANTOS; 
OLIVEIRA, 2008). That way, we employ the real exchange rate as our second commercial variable, whose 
degree of depreciation reflects the competitiveness of national products abroad and, therefore, the 
sustainability of the balance of payments. Lastly, our third variable is the percentage of fuels in the 
exporting agenda of each country, since this index indicates the vulnerability of the balance of payments to 
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Table 1: Definition and Sources of the Variables 
Geography 
Variable Definition and Source. 
Distance from the Equator Ln 
Measured by calculating the distance from the Equator and 
dividing it by 90. Source World Bank (2019), also Gallup et al. 
(1998) and Hall and Jones (1999). 
Population Ln 
Total number of inhabitants in a country. Source: World Bank 
(2019). 
Institutions 
Rule of Law 
Rule of law is a common institutional measure used by the World 
Bank. It “measures the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence”. Source: World Bank (2019). 
Contract Intensive Money (CIM) Ln 
Initially proposed by Clague (1999), it is based on a citizens’ 
decision regarding the form by which they chose to hold their 
financial assets. It is a measure of the enforceability of contracts 
and the safety of property rights. Source: World Development 
Indicators, World Bank (2019). 
Infant Mortality Ln 
Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before 
reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2019). 
Financial Risk Ln 
The quality level of a country’s financial system, a component of 
the international country risk. Source: International Country Risk 
Guide, Harvard Database (2019). 
Control of Corruption 
It measures the perception of patrimonialism, that is to say the 
use of the State apparatus with private aims. Source: World Bank 
(2019). 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
It measures the likelihood of government destabilization by 
unconstitutional or violent means. Source: World Bank (2019). 
International Trade 
Real Exchange Rate Ln 
Controls for terms of trade. The real exchange rate can be defined 
in the long run as the nominal exchange rate (e) that is adjusted 
by the ratio of the foreign price level (Pf) to the domestic price 
level (Pd). Rer=e(Pf /Pd). This data was taken from the WDI and 
calculated manually. 
Fuel Exports Ln 
Fuel exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports. 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2019). 
Openness Ln 
Openness index which was originally created by Sachs and 
Warner (1995) but has been updated by the World Bank. (Exports 
+ Imports) /GDP. Source: World Development Indicators, World 
Bank (2019). 
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Gallup et al. (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and the World Bank (2019). 
 
 It is also imperative to notice that, except geography, the deep determinants of growth face 
endogeneity issues. Institutional quality and trade patterns, aside from influencing economic performance, 
can be affected by it. The explanation for this relies on the pressure led by agents that contribute to growth 
toward pro-market institutions (Chang, 2011) and on the effects that growth exerts on imports and exports 
and, consequently, on the exchange rate. That way, the correlations identified by our econometric test may 
demonstrate a twofold causality for institutional and commercial variables, what we have sought to correct 
by employing instrumental variables, which, as noted by literature, consist in “a viable option for 
overcoming the endogeneity problems that plague this literature” (PERRY; SCHONERWALD, 2012, p. 71). 
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Results 
In order to test the effect of the three determinants of growth on income per capita of BRICS 
countries from 1995 to 2015, we have chosen to employ Hausman-Taylor (see appendix A)5 method. An 
important purpose in combining time-series and cross-section data is to control for individual-specific 
unobservable effects which may be correlated with other explanatory variables. An important benefit from 
pooling time-series and cross-section data is the ability to control for individual-specific effects-possibly 
unobservable-which may be correlated with other included variables in the specification of an economic 
relationship. According to Baltagi et al. (2003), the Hausman-Taylor estimators are consistent when there is 
endogeneity among the regressors; indeed, there is substantial bias in OLS and RE estimators and both yield 
to misleading inference, since the FE estimator is a consistent estimator but its disadvantage is that it does 
not allow the estimation of the coefficients of time invariant regressors.  
 
Table 2 presents the variables as well as the descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
In all our regressions on table 3, the direct effect of geographic variables (exogenous) is related to 
BRICS countries’ GDP per capita. Statistically, population is (positively) significant at the 5 per cent level in 
two regressions and significant at the 1 per cent level in one. This corroborates the optimism of the scholars 
who envisaged an economic potential in the aforementioned group due to its large population, which 
gathers more than 40% of the world inhabitants. Distance from the Equator, however, is not statistically 
significant in any regression. We do not believe, even though, that this fact is inconsistent with the branch 
of literature that relates geography to growth, but a consequence of the continental size of the four BRIC 
countries, which combine, in the same state, regions of quite different latitudes.  
 
                                                          
5 This is an issue in this paper because some data is time variant (institutions), while other data is time invariant (geography). 
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Table 3: Panel Regression Results 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors 
 
 Our trade variables, in turn, also do not defy frontally the dominant assumptions in the Academia. 
In all regressions, the real exchange rate exhibits a positive significance at the 10 per cent level, confirming 
that fostering exports succeeds in stimulating production. The same way, the result suggested by literature 
for the percentage of fuels in the exports agenda was obtained; the regressions show this index is negative 
and highly6 significant, proving that oscillations of prices of these resources in the international market 
make the economies vulnerable, less resistant and, hence, less capable of keeping a sustained growth. 
                                                          
6 By highly significant, we mean significant at the 1 per cent level. 
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Although, the openness index did not achieve, in any regression, significance. We believe that it is possible 
to explain this result by the continental size of BRICS member countries and the remarkable reduction of 
poverty in the last years, what allowed the rise of a new middle class and, that way, a development strategy 
whose major player is the internal market.  
 When we analyze institutional variables, however, all the expectations based upon mainstream 
literature are countered. It would be hoped (taking into account mainstream literature) that institutions 
caring for private property rights intellectual property, fiscal responsibility, financial sanity and social 
welfare, following the recommendations from organisms such as the World Bank and IMF, kept a positive 
relationship with GDP per capita insofar, on the one hand, they produce an expectational environment 
propitious to investments and, on the other hand, are enacted in a growth context by pressure efforts from 
economic groups. These principles are taken into account in the indices of infant mortality, rule of law, 
CIM, political stability and absence of violence, control of corruption and financial risk.  
With the aim of certifying that the obtained results are not due to a relationship of badly chosen 
variables, we have elaborated three regressions, adding new variables between them. This is also a means of 
avoiding that a single variable that could conceivably be endogenous drive the results, as Frankel and Romer 
(1999) have already proposed. That way, whilst the first one contains infant mortality, rule of law, CIM and 
financial risk, we have added political stability and absence of violence to the second one and also control of 
corruption to the third one.  
Astonishingly, in no regression any of these variables is statistically significant. Thus, in spite of 
geography and international trade, the results for institutional variables challenge the established 
literature. We examine why. 
 
Institutions: “A Point Outside the Curb”  
First of all, momentarily ignoring failures of institutionalist theory, we present the 
inappropriateness of indices that measure the quality of institutions as an explanation for the lack of 
significance of our independent variables related to institutions. They evaluate the institutional structure 
from the viewpoint of Western liberal democracy, related to a constitutionalist view (rule of law), stable and 
consolidated financial institutions (CIM and financial risk), the ability to perform their functions efficiently 
and credibly (government effectiveness) and also the assurance of social rights. The question we will to raise 
is: in an absolutely diverse and plural world, do these variables, also employed by studies of various 
international organizations and in various academic works, really reflect a country's institutional 
predisposition to growth?  
The fact is that the above-mentioned indicators do not succeed in measuring the respect for 
property rights (their main aim) and, hence, the way institutions relate to economic growth (ROS, 2013). 
There are, in the world economic history, many cases of authoritarian regimes, in which an independent and 
stable justice and financial system lacks, that, in the practice, were successful in protecting the property 
rights- even more than liberal democracies. A contemporary example is Singapore, a country where the 
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economic boom and the hardening of restrictive and eccentric laws, without guarantee of press freedom or 
impartial justice, have been coexisted for many years. In the same manner, Chile under Augusto Pinochet’s 
government (1973-1990), in spite of being under a harsh and arbitrary dictatorship, tightly ensured private 
property and attracted a great amount of investment flows. 
In the concrete case of BRICS, it is imperative not to set aside the Russia-China duality. Whilst in 
the latter private property is not legally recognized, as well as there is no independent judicial system, in 
contrast to the former, it is in China where the investors feel safer (Rodrik, 2014). This happens because of 
institutional arrangements built differently from the ones adopted by Western democracies and thus not 
embedded in the employed indicators. The Chinese government, in the 1980s, introduced the Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs), that is to say companies owned by local government with which national and 
foreign private enterprises establish partnerships and attain a share in the profits. In Russia, on the other 
hand, the formal constitutionalism contrasts with a wide incertitude in reality: a slow and corrupt judicial 
system thwarts the effective application of law and, consequently, undermines investor confidence.  
 It can be concluded, therefore, that the existence of means to ensure private property (and thus 
generate safety and good expectations to capitalists) confronting the assumptions implicit in the variables 
employed by our econometric model is an important factor in comprehending the unexpected results. Its 
explanatory power, however, is only partial. The problem cannot be fully understood without challenging 
the content of the premises of mainstream institutionalist theories, including NIE, of North and Coase.  
Jaime Ros (2013) argues that one of the pillars of this branch of literature is the “invisible hand” 
tradition, whose roots are tied in Adam Smith. In this vision, a minimal state, with lean institutions and a 
restrict playing field, could align the social and individual return taxes and, hence, generate what the author 
calls a good social infrastructure. These postulates are embedded in the main indices that intend to measure 
the institutional quality since they are formulated by institutions, such as the World Bank, bound by a 
current of thought that, in spite of supporting the active role of the State in the development (through 
infrastructure works, for instance), advocates for fiscal austerity and market freedom. It is in the light of this 
reality that the formulation of indicators such as rule of law, control of corruption and government 
effectiveness must be understood. These axioms, however, have already been refuted by the economic 
thought.  
Initially, Ros argues that, when there are market failures, no Pareto-optimal outcomes are 
accomplished through policies that maximize economic freedom. This would only happen under very 
specific conditions which are practically impossible in practice. This is an agreement between heterodoxy 
and the market failures orthodoxy. In addition, the author, based on Lipsey and Lancaster's second-best 
theory, emphasizes that even in the absence of a perfect market, not necessarily greater liberalism would 
generate greater allocative efficiency; in any case, allocative efficiency and growth are different concepts, 
and the former may not lead to the latter.  
It is also possible to find empirical evidences for Ros’s arguments. In the 90s, the compliance of 
Latin American countries to the institutional agenda enshrined by Washington Consensus, with 
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deregulations, privatizations and intellectual property legislation, meant low growth rates and grave 
difficulties in the terms of trade of these nations (Palma, 2004).  
Therefore, in addition to the fact that most institutional indices do not succeed in measuring 
inviolability of property rights (a key element in attracting investments and generating economic growth), 
fails on the premises of institutionalist theory explain the startling results of our econometric model.  
 
Conclusion 
Using panel data for BRICS countries and applying the Hausman-Taylor estimator, we have found 
out that both geography and international trade matter for economic growth, in accordance with the 
assumptions in literature. Even though, institutions work at odds with the main tradition of the Academia.  
From these results, it is clear that the institutionalist research focuses excessively on developed and 
Western nations and on their economic thought, neglecting particularities of economic thinking and 
practice of oriental or emerging countries. The mentioned mistakes are embedded in the main indices 
employed by international organizations and academic works and, hence, perpetuate the prescription of 
misguiding agendas to these nations, such as the Washington Consensus, and avoid the good understanding 
of the development of countries (such as China) facing dictatorships and economic policies that confront 
the logic of the free market.  
In summary, a suitable institutional analysis must count for a global comprehension, recognizing 
the disparities among nations regarding the different roles assigned to the state. That way, antagonistic 
senses of democracy and the existence of distinct means to reach the same end (economic development) - 
the “many recipes” to which Rodrik (2007) refers - must be taken into account. Therefore, although 
econometric tests may be relevant tools to comprehend the multidimensionality of economic growth, a 
theoretical understanding of each variable used is unavoidable in order to reach a more accurate 
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 Analysis of cross-section data alone can neither identify nor control for such individual effects. The following equations 
illustrate: 
 
                                                               (i= 1,…, N; t = 1,…, T) 
 Where and  are k and g vectors of coefficients associated with time-varying and time-invariant observable variables 
respectively. The disturbance  is assumed uncorrelated with the columns of (X, Z, ) and has zero mean and constant variance 
 conditional on and . The latent individual effect  is assumed to be a time-invariant random variable, distributed 
independently across individuals, with variance . 
 Hausman and Taylor (1981) explain that the OLS coefficient estimates from the transformed data (known as "within-groups" 
or "fixed effects" estimators) have two important defects: (1) all time-invariant variables are eliminated by the transformation, so that y 
cannot be estimated; and (2) under certain circumstances, the within-groups estimator is not fully efficient since it ignores variation 
across individuals in the sample. The first problem is generally the more serious since in some applications, primary interest is 
attached to the unknown coefficients of the time-invariant variables. 
The Hausman-Taylor method uses assumptions about the correlations between the columns of (X, Z) and 
  
a i. If we are 
willing to assume that certain variables among the X and Z are uncorrelated with 
  
a i, then conditions may hold such that all of the 
  
b 's and 
  
g 's may be consistently and efficiently estimated. Intuitively, the columns of 
  
Xitwhich are uncorrelated with 
  
a i can 
serve two functions because of their variation across both individuals and time: (i) using deviations from individual means, they 
produce unbiased estimates of the 
  
b 's, and (ii) using the individual means, they provide valid instruments for the columns of 
  
Zi, 
that are correlated with 
  
a i. 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) point out from the equation (1) the properties of conventional estimators in the absence and 
presence of specification errors of the form
  
E a i | Xit ,Zi( ) ¹ 0. Thus 
 
  
Yit = Xitb + Zig + eit  (2) 
  
eit = a i + hit 
 
 where they believe that 
  
E eit | Xit ,Zi( ) = E a i |Xit ,Zi( ) ¹ 0. Note that, somewhat unconventionally, 
  
Xit  and 
  
Zi 
denote TN x k and TN x g matrices respectively, whose subscripts indicate variation over individuals (i= 1,…, N) and time (t = 1,…, T). 
Observations are ordered first by individual and then by time, so that 
  
a i and each column of 
  
Zi are TN vectors having blocks of T 
identical entries within each i= 1,..., N.  
 The prior information the Hausman-Taylor procedure uses the ability to distinguish columns of X and Z which are 
asymptotically uncorrelated with 
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 where  ][ 21 ititit XXX   of dimensions ][ 21 kTNkTN ´´  , 
][ 21 iiit ZZZ =  of dimensions 














 Income per capita Ln 
Distance from the 
Equator 
Population Ln Exchange Rate Ln 
Income per 
capita Ln 
1.00000000 0.1433899 -0.40844378 -0.61099530 
Distance from 
the Equator 
0.14338988 1.0000000 -0.10288424 0.27518111 
Population Ln -0.40844378 -0.1028842 1.00000000 0.29936098 
Exchange Rate 
Ln 
-0.61099530 -0.61099530 0.29936098 1.00000000 
Openness Ln -0.19203972 0.5540754 -0.07508862 0.82590011 
CMI Ln -0.08836475 -0.8633993 0.05047724 0.04390953 
Infant 
Mortality Ln 
-0.39344028 -0.4242399 -0.50577779 0.23922263 
Rule of Law 0.04254776 -0.7181593 -0.37624841 -0.02217261 
Financial Risk 
Ln 





0.04372151 -0.8198236 -0.19778409 -0.25062235 
Control of 
Corruption 
-0.09000237 -0.7199018 -0.47305254 -0.13731017 
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 Openness Ln CMI Ln Infant Mortality Ln Rule of Law 
Income per capita Ln -0.19203972 -0.08836475 -0.39344028 0.04254776 
Distance from the 
Equator 
0.55407539 -0.86339935 -0.42423990 -0.71815931 
Population Ln -0.07508862 0.05047724 -0.50577779 -0.37624841 
Exchange Rate Ln 0.82590011 0.04390953 0.23922263 -0.02217261 
Openness Ln 1.00000000 -0.19932116 0.12539648 -0.09485985 
CMI Ln -0.19932116 1.00000000 0.52748339 0.85567229 
Infant Mortality Ln 0.12539648 0.52748339 1. 00000000 0.72787462 
Rule of Law -0.09485985 0.85567229 0.72787462 1.00000000 
Financial Risk Ln 0.06091308 0.57543724 0.01383978 0.39223905 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
-0.36408404 0.80585265 0.52584590 0.80561525 
Control of Corruption -0.23319735 0.72039410 0.80619944 0.87393120 
Fuel Exports ln 0.32804815 -0.73375172 -0.25662384 -0.40312649 
 
 
 Financial Risk Ln 
Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence 
Control of Corruption Fuel Exports ln 
Income per capita Ln 0.05207380 0.04372151 -0.09000237 0.4378362 
Distance from the 
Equator 
-0.35626319 -0.81982358 -0.71990179 0.7699716 
Population Ln 0.37108814 -0.19778409 -0.47305254 -0.5519636 
Exchange Rate Ln 0.21311804 -0.25062235 -0.13731017 -0.1354738 
Openness Ln 0.06091308 -0.36408404 -0.23319735 0.3280482 
CMI Ln 0.57543724 0.80585265 0.72039410 -0.7337517 
Infant Mortality Ln 0.01383978 0.52584590 0.80619944 -0.2566238 
Rule of Law 0.39223905 0.80561525 0.87393120 -0.4031265 
Financial Risk Ln 1.00000000 0.29998051 0.17335031 -0.4322334 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
0.29998051 1.00000000 0.71333642 -0.4824951 
Control of Corruption 0.17335031 0.71333642 1.00000000 -0.3583334 
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RESUMO 
Este artigo discute o papel dos três determinantes profundos do desenvolvimento econômico (geografia, 
instituições e comércio internacional) nos países do BRICS (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul) entre 
1995 e 2015. Primeiramente, aponta-se a dificuldade de analisar se os determinantes funcionam ou não de 
forma simultânea, porquanto a maioria dos autores não concorda com a ideia de coordenação. Outrossim, 
considera-se que as instituições são muito diferentes entre esses países, especialmente no caso da China, 
que melhorou a renda per capita sem se enquadrar nos padrões dos Indicadores de Governança Mundial. 
Terceiro, o artigo apresenta brevemente a história recente do BRICS, aplicando o método de Hausman e 
Taylor (1981) para controlar o efeitodas variáveis endógenas e das invariantes no tempo. Conclui-se assim 
que, por um lado, a geografia e o comércio internacional têm sido importantes para explicar o desempenho 
econômico dos países do BRICS sem desafiar a literatura atual e, por outro, a influência das instituições, 
apesar de relevante, não corresponde às hipóteses enraizadas na literatura. China e Rússia são países com 
instituições específicas, portanto os resultados não acompanham os resultados anteriores sobre o papel das 
instituições, sugerindo que os indicadores podem ter tendência para a ideologia liberal. 




This paper discusses the role of the three deep determinants of economic development (geography, 
institutions and international trade) in BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) from 
1995 to 2015. First of all, we argue that it is difficult to point out whether or not the determinants work 
simultaneously, since most authors do not agree with the idea of coordination. Secondly, we raise the 
viewpoint that institutions are very different among these nations, especially in the case of China, which 
has improved per capita income without fitting in the standards of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
Third, we briefly present the recent history of the bloc and apply the Hausman and Taylor (1981) method to 
controls for endogenous as well as time-invariant variables. We conclude that, on the one hand, geography 
and international trade have been important to explain the economic performance of BRICS countries 
without challenging the mainstream literature; on the other hand, the influence of institutions, even 
though relevant, does not correspond with the hypotheses rooted in the literature. China and Russia are 
countries with particular institutions, so the outcomes do not follow previous results about the role of 
institutions, suggesting that indicators may be biased toward liberal ideology.  
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